

**CONFIDENTIAL**

28 November 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pub. ORE

ATTENTION :

25X1A

SUBJECT : Request for Intelligence Information

1. It is requested that this office be provided with the following intelligence information:

(a) The nature, extent, and value of mining rights in Greece held by a Swiss holding company called Bauxit Trust. The Greek corporation owned by this holding company has mining rights near Megara and in the Parnassos.

(b) Any other available data on Bauxit Trust.

2. This information is desired as early as practicable or by 7 December 1949.

25X1A

Reference: Case #643

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~~Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100050003-9~~

## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

**FROM:** 25X1A 28 November 1949  
[REDACTED] - 249 South

ACCESSION NO.

DATE RECEIVED IN S. A.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
D/Pub.ORE <span style="background-color: black; color: black;">[REDACTED]</span>	2501 "M"				
25X1A					
3.					
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**SECRET**

1 December 1949

25X1A

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Request for Intelligence Information

1. It is requested that this office be furnished with information on the following:

A. What are the major plants producing armor plate, special and high grade steels? What was the production (in metric tons) at each of these plants in 1948? The first 6 months of 1949?

B. Are plants #71 and #74 at Ishevsk (Urals) and #172 at Molotov (Urals) important special steel producers for ordnance? What percentage of total Soviet steel for ordnance do they produce? What was their production in 1948? The first 6 months of 1949?

C. What routes are used for transportation of coking coal from mines to iron and steel plants in the Ukraine?

D. What is the delivery (in metric tons) of coking coal from the Kuzbas to individual steel plants in the Urals (total for each plant in 1949)?

E. How dependent are Ural steel plants (in 1948 and 1949) on coking coal from Koraganda?

F. Which locomotive plants produce their own steel? How important are they compared to other locomotive plants? Do they produce sufficient steel for their own needs? If not, where do they obtain the additional steel needed?

G. What minerals used in special steels are the Soviets finding difficulty in supply? What is the cause of the difficulty? Where are the mines? Which plants do these mines supply?

H. Which plants supply steel for the following?  
How much was supplied by each in 1948? The first 6 months

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-2-

6 months of 1949?

(1) Heavy Tank Plants at:

Chelyabinsk	Ufa
Dnepropetrovsk	Zlatoust
Gorki	

(2) Heavy Artillery Plants at:


Sverdlovsk	Leningrad
Stalinsk	Kramatorsk
Vladivostok	Chelyabinsk

(3) Heavy Mortar Plants at:

Moscow	Sverdlovsk
Molotov	Barnaul
Krasnoyarsk	Rostov
Kuibyshev	Kiev
Novosibirsk	Makhachkala
Khabarovsk	Kramatorsk

I. Which plants supply steel for Soviet submarine plants? How much was supplied by each in 1948? For the first 6 months of 1949?

25X1A



Reference: Case No. 628

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Draft

9 December 1949

SUBJECT: Industrial Information on the USSR  
REFERENCE: Case No. 628

IP-47

A. No answer possible under time limit.

B. Plants #71 and #74 at Izhevsk and #172 at Molotov are both important

producers of high grade steel for the ordnance industry of the USSR.

Their percentage of steel produced for ordnance, 1948 and 1949 production is not known.

C. In reply to paragraph (C) of subject memorandum, the density of freight

traffic on the coal routes is three times the average for the Soviet

Union. In the Ukraine, the electrification of the route: Dolgintsevo-

Nikopol and the reported extension of this electrification to Zaporozhe

is an indication of heavy freight traffic on this route. Further reports

state that the line Debaltsevo-Kolpakovo-Zverovo is electrified and it is

possible that this route will be linked to Zaporozhe via Chaplino into one

electrified line. Stations and yards in the Ukraine are reportedly being

electrified. In addition to the main east-west route described above, the

steam-operated lines of the Stalin, North Donets, and South Donets Railroads

are the principal carriers of coal freight. The hub of the Ukrainian coal

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net is Stalino. A double-tracked north-south line runs from the steel plants at Mariupol to the mining and steel area at Stalino. From this city, a double-tracked line leads to Kiev. In addition to the dense local net about Stalino, through lines run from that city to Voroshilovgrad and Taganrog. It is believed that the principal coking plants and mining areas in the Ukraine are on these routes.

D. This question cannot be answered directly. However, the following coke production chart for 1949 may be of use. The plants mentioned below are those which process coal from the Kuznetek basin.

<u>Coke Plant</u>	<u>Metric Tons</u>
Magnitogorsk	4,300,000
Novo-Tagil	1,950,000
Chelyabinsk	1,250,000
Gubakha	500,000
Orsk	1,000,000
Kemerovo	3,500,000
Kuznetek (in Stalinsk)	<u>3,500,000</u>
Total production	16,000,000

E. Coking coal from the Karaganda basin has played an important part in the development of the Urals iron and steel industry in recent years. This basin is located 600 kms. nearer the southern Urals industry than is the Kuznetek basin.

Coal reserves of the Karaganda basin are estimated at 53 million tons.

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portion can be used if it is cleaned and mixed with high quality coking coal. Karaganda coal can thus be utilized either by mixing the various Karaganda coals or by blending it with coals from the Kuznetak or Kisel basins.

In 1940, the basin provided 620,000 tons of coking coal or 20 percent of the consumption in the Urals for that year. Output in 1944 increased 1.2 times over the 1940 level and was stepped up to 2.5 times the 1940 level in 1947. Soviet planned goals call for an annual output, beginning in 1948, of 2.5 to 3.0 million tons.

Increased production, however, will depend upon the solving of various economic and technical problems. Chief among these is the problem of utilizing a wider assortment of coals, particularly those which contain a relatively high ash content. It is probable that production from this basin in 1949 will reach 2.5 million tons.

F. A full reply to paragraph (F) of subject memorandum would require detailed study. Information readily available in this office concerns the following plants:

a. The Voroshilovgrad Locomotive Factory produces steel but also imports

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steel and iron ore from Magnitogorsk. It is possible that this factory accounts for 40 percent of Soviet locomotive production.

b. The Kolonna Factory in Moscow has 3 open hearth furnaces and 6 Bessemer converters. It accounts for approximately 25 percent of USSR locomotive production.

c. The Beshitsa Locomotive Factory has 3 open hearth furnaces but it is reported that "steel of the hardest type is brought from the Urals". The plant receives ingots in 3 qualities of steel. Connecting rods, valves, injectors, generators, boilers, and steam pipes are obtained locally from Bryansk. Coal and coke are received from the Donets area. Crude iron shipments in bars come from the Urals. Shipments of "steel ingots and gray cast iron" are also brought in from the Urals. The Beshitsa plant accounts for approximately 9 percent of Soviet locomotive production.

d. The Novocherkassk Locomotive Factory has 3 Bessemer converters, and 6 blast furnaces were scheduled in October 1948 for construction.

e. The Krasnoye Sormovo Factory at Gorkij manufactures several types of water craft, military vehicles, and railroad equipment including locomotives. The plant is reported to receive 6,250 tons of steel monthly from

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the Kirov plant at Kulebaki (Havashino 55°22'N-42°35'E). Coal and other raw materials come from Donets and the Urals. Steel is also made at the plant. In addition to a rolling mill, the plant operates two foundries with 9 Siemens-Martin open-hearth furnaces, two electric furnaces, and casting machinery.

f. The Ufa Foundry produces locomotive wheels and the Orsk Foundry manufactures locomotive parts.

g. The following minerals used in special steels are in short supply in the USSR: molybdenum, cobalt, vanadium and tungsten. The short supply is due to the lack of sufficiently developed ore bodies of these minerals.

Mine locations (principal location of operating mines)

Molybdenum

- |                                      |                   |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Tyrny-Auz — Kabardino-Balkar ASSR | 43°20'N - 42°50'E |
| 2. Karobi — Georgian SSR             | 42°45'N - 43°30'E |
| 3. Balkhash — Kazakh SSR             | 47°N - 75°E       |
| 4. Balshoi Kebin Kirgiz SSR          | 43°N - 76°20'E    |
| 5. Chikoi (Outai) Chita Obl.         | 50°N - 108°12'E   |
| 6. Vnalta Khabarovsk Krai            | 51°30'N - 134°E   |

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Gobalt

- |                             |                   |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Rezh Sverdlovsk Obl.     | 57°25'N - 61°20'E |
| 2. Vfalet Chelyabinsk       | 56°5'N - 60°15'E  |
| 3. Dashkesan Azerbaijan SSR | 40°32'N - 46°5'E  |

Vanadium

- |                           |                   |
|---------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Kerch Crimea ASSR      | 45°20'N - 36°15'E |
| 2. Kusa Chelyabinsk Obl.  | 55°20'N - 59°45'E |
| 3. Suleimansai Kazakh SSR | 43°10'N - 70°20'E |
| 4. Tuya-Muyum Kirgiz SSR  | 40°20'N - 72°35'E |

Tungsten

- |                                    |                   |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Tyzny-Auz Kabardino-Balkar ASSR | 43°20'N - 42°50'E |
| 2. Gumbeika Chelyabinsk Obl.       | 55°20' - 59°30'   |
| 3. Langar Samarkand Obl.           | 40°30' - 65°55'   |
| 4. Akchatau Karaganda Obl.         | 48° - 74°30'      |
| 5. Kalba Kuzakh SSR                | 49° - 83°84'      |
| 6. Ubinsk " "                      | 50°15' - 81°45'   |
| 7. Kolyvan' Altai Krai             | 51°20' - 82°30'   |
| 8. Tuinsk Krasnoyarsk Krai         | 54°30' - 90°      |
| 9. Dzkhida Buryat-Mongol ASSR      | 50°25' - 103°30'  |
| 10. Sherlovaya Chita Obl.          | 50°35' - 116°10'  |
| 11. Belukha " "                    | 51°18' - 116°55°  |
| 12. Unglichikan Khabarovsk Krai    | 53°5' - 133°35'   |

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These mines eventually supply all steel mills in the USSR which require these elements in the making of various special steels. However, there are four main plants which process the ores into ferro-tungsten, ferro-molybdenum, etc. These plants are:

1. Ferro-alloy plant, Zestafoni, Georgian SSR
2. Ferrosplav ferro-alloy plant, Chelyabinsk, Urals
3. Ferro-alloy plant, Aktyubinsk, Kazakh SSR
4. Zaporozhtal, Zaporozhe, Ukrainian SSR

H. Plants furnishing steel for the following, plus amounts furnished whenever possible. (including pre-1948 amounts)

#### Heavy Tank Plants

1. Chelyabinsk - The heavy tank plant at Chelyabinsk up through 1944 received some imported steels via Baku. The Tank Industry Supply in Krasnovodsk furnished some steel. Certain alloy steels were reported shipped to Chelyabinsk from Makhach-kala. Most of the steel seems to have come from Magnitogorsk, 55,000 tons monthly in 1944. The tank plant itself produced 7,250 tons of steel per month in 1944.

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2. Dnepropetrovsk - no information available on sources of supply of iron and steel.
3. Gorki - The Gorki tank plant (Molotov Auto Factory) in 1944 received 6,000 tons of steel monthly from the Kulebaki Metallurgical Plant, 7,000 tons monthly from the Vyksa Metallurgical Plant in Mishne-Vykovski, and produced 1,000 tons of steel per month.
4. Ufa - no information available which would answer the request.
5. Zlatoust - no information available which would answer the request.

Heavy artillery plants

1. Sverdlovsk - possibly the same as the heavy mortar plant in Sverdlovsk.
2. Stalinsk - the Stalinsk Gun Plant is a part of the Kuznetski Metallurgical Combine named Stalina and receives its steel from the Combine.
3. Valdivostok - is supplied with steel from Amurstal in Komsomolsk. No 1948 or 1949 figures available.

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4. Leningrad - no information available which would answer the request.
5. Kramatorsk - the plant was reported as producing 200,000 tons of steel per year in 1941. Probably is self sufficient in steel except possibly for some special steels.
6. Chelyabinsk - is same plant as the Heavy Tank Plant.

#### Heavy Mortar Plants

1. Moscow - no information available which would answer the request.
2. Molotov - the Chemical Combine named Kirov produced mortars and made some of its own steel; it has one or two open hearth furnaces. The gun billets are obtained from plant #112 Krasnoye Sormovo in Gorki.

The Molotov Armament Plant is the largest in the USSR. According to a 1943 report it produced some 350,000 tons of steel per year. Thus, this plant is almost entirely self sufficient in steel. Some cast iron was imported from Kuzbass and Nizhne-

Tagil, profile steel from Chusovoi and Maikop, and ferro-alloys from Chelyabinsk.

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3. Krasnoyarsk - this plant was reported as producing some 20,000 tons per year in 1943. It is at least partially self-sufficient.
4. Kuibyshev - no information available which would answer the request.
5. Novosibirsk - in 1944, this plant had a rated yearly steel capacity of 45,000 tons. It is at least partially self-sufficient.
6. Khabarovsk - in 1944 and 1947 was supplied with steel from Amurstal in Komsomol'sk.
7. Sverdlovsk - no information available which would answer the request.
8. Barnaul - no information available which would answer the request.
9. Rostov - the Krasny-Aksai Mortar Plant from 1942-1945 received steel from Makeevka, and cast iron and scrap from the Donbas Metal Distributor and Collecting Point Rostov.
10. Kiev - no information available which would answer the request.
11. Mahach Kala - produces at least part of its own requirements.

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**I. Submarine Plants**

1. The Vladivostok shipyard in 1941 produced 10,000 tons of steel for its own use. In 1948 it was reported to be assembling submarines from parts shipped from Leningrad.
2. The Gorki Shipyard - probably receives its steel from Krasnoye Sormovo Steel Plant in Gorki.
3. Nikolaev, Ukraine - the "Marti" submarine plant produces at least part of its own steel. In 1936 it produced 6,900 tons of raw steel per month.

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Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100050003-9

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Project:

**IP-47**

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date:

**2 Dec 49**

To:

**D/EE**

From: Publications Division, Projects Planning **REL**

Subject: **Industrial information on the USSR.**

Statement of Project:

Origin:

Problem:

**To provide available information as indicated.**

Scope:

**It is understood that D/EE will provide as much of the information requested in Case. No. 628 as is readily available.**

Graphics (if any):

Form:

**Memorandum to be drafted by D/EE**

Draft due in D/Pub:

**9 December 1949**

(if any):

**9 December 49**

Responsible Division:

**D/EE**

Internal Coordination:

**As needed**

Departmental responsibilities: **None at present, although the exploitation of ID GSUSA at a later date is recommended.**

Classification to be no higher than: **Top Secret**

Recommended Dissemination:

**Requester only**

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UNCLASSIFIED		RESTRICTED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET													
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP																			
TO		INITIALS		DATE															
1	D/Pub 25X1A																		
2	Att: [REDACTED]	upm		12/9/49															
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REMARKS: Attached are two draft copies of IP-47. Readily available information only is included.																			

Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100050003-9

File  
IP-47

CONFIDENTIAL

23 November 1949

25X1A

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : USSR Production Figures and Capital Equipment.

1. Production figures and capital equipment, including location of major plants, for the following industries of the USSR: steel, machine tools, vehicles (including tanks) aircraft, rubber and atomic. Also location of deposits and latest production figures on oil, manganese, aluminum and atomic ores. Also a report on the major forms of transportation. The above information is requested in the form of the latest definition reports on the various subjects.

25X1A

[REDACTED]

25X1A

request. called on 24 Nov & said  
I drew his attention to ORE 24-49 (which  
will be ready printed, about 20 Dec.) and  
asked WJH to send a corrected draft  
forthwith.  
CEL

This memo has been superseded by one dated  
2 November 1949, and materials requested  
will appear as IP-47.

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Reference: Case # 28

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**SECRET**

*File*

Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100050003-9

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

Project: **IP-40**

OFFICE OF ROUTING AND ESTIMATION

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: **5 Dec 1969**

To: **D/EO, D/EE**

From: Publications Division, Projects Planning

Subject: **Scandinavian election results**

Statement of Project:

Origin: **Internal**

Problem: **To provide most recent election results for Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Finland**

Scope: **Breakdown by party, to include popular vote and resultant parliamentary representation**

Graphics (if any):

Form: **Figures only**

Draft due to D/EO: **0900 6 Dec**

Classification deadline  
(if any)

**6 Dec 1969**

Responsible Division: **D/EO, D/EE**

Internal Coordination: **None**

Departmental responsibilities: **None**

Classification is to be maintained

**RESTRICTED**

Recommended dissemination

**R.O.**

**SECRET**


Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100050003-9

1. Scandinavia - Electronics
2. Norway - Electronics
3. Ireland - Electronics
4. Denmark - Electronics
5. Finland - Electronics

RESTRICTED

IP-48


5 December 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/pub, ORE 25X1A  
ATTENTION :   
SUBJECT : Scandanavian Election Results

1. A breakdown of popular vote and of parliamentary representation resulting from the October national elections in Norway and Iceland is requested.

2. The same data on the most recent Danish and Finnish elections is also desired.

25X1A



Reference: Case No. 686

RESTRICTED

Election Results\* 1949

Iceland

<u>Party</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>% of total</u>	<u>Seats</u>
Conservative	28,546	39.5	19
Progressives	17,659	24.5	17
Communists	14,077	19.5	9
Social Democrats	11,938	16.5	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>72,220</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>52</b>

Norway\*

Labor	800,792	45.8	85
Conservative	277,913	15.9	23
Liberal	216,581	12.4	21
Agrarian	85,008	4.9	12
Communist	101,666	5.8	0
Christian Peoples	146,413	8.4	9
Combined Lists	106,959	6.1	0
Community Party	12,914	0.7	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,748,246</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>150</b>

\* Actual vote count is subject to official recheck but no change in allocation of seats is anticipated

Denmark

UPPER HOUSE (result of April 1947 election)

<u>Party</u>	<u>Votes</u>	<u>Seats</u>
Social Democrats	304,228	38
Moderate Liberals	185,108	21
Conservatives	103,076	13
Radical Liberals	43,201	7
Communists	71,907	1
League of Justice	18,362	0
Danish Union	8,547	0
Faeroe Islands rep.	-	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>714,419</b>	<b>76</b>

LOWER HOUSE (resulting from national election 28 Oct 47)

Social Democrats	834,089	57
Moderate Liberals	575,033	49
Conservatives	284,146	17
Radical Liberals	144,133	10
Communists	141,094	9
League of Justice	94,477	6
Danish Union	24,715	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,077,687 plus 2 Faeroe Is. reps.</b>	<b>148</b>
		<b>2</b>
		<b>150</b>



6 December 1949

SUBJECT: Contribution to IP-48, "Results of Most Recent Elections in Finland"

The most recent national elections in Finland were held on 1 and 2 July 1948. Results were as follows:

<u>Party</u>	<u>Popular Vote</u>	<u>Diet Seats</u>
Social Democrats	494,719	54
Agrarian	455,635	56
Democratic Union (SKDL)	375,820	38
Coalition	320,366	33
Swedish People's	145,455	14
Progressives	73,444	5
Others	<u>14,529</u> 1,879,968	<u>200</u>

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File

Project: **2P-49**

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF RECENTS AND ESTIMATES  
Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: **7 Dec 1949**

To: **D/NE**

From: Publications Division, Projects Planning **REL**

Subject: **Transmission of strategic materials through SovZone Germany**

Statement of Project:

Origin: **Internal**

Problem: **To provide "intelligence information concerning the transmission of strategic military or its components to the USSR and satellites from or through eastern Germany with particular reference to natural and synthetic fuel refineries and plants."**

Scope: **Note that D/NE's statement of problem has been accepted by requester**

Graphics (if any):

Forms: **None**

Draft due in D/Pub: **earliest convenient**

Dissemination deadline (if any):

Responsible Division: **D/NE**

Internal Coordination: **As needed**

Departmental responsibilities: **None**

Classification to be no higher than:

**TOP SECRET**

Recommended Dissemination:

**Requester only**

**SECRET**

1. East-West trade
2. Germany, East - Exports

IP-49

By memo to me, dated 6 Feb, and enclosing copy of memo from Straus to Barnard, Barnard indicated that OIR declined participation in this project.

7 Feb 50

REL

**SECRET**

2 December 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pub. ORE 25X1A  
ATTENTION : [REDACTED]  
SUBJECT : Intelligence Information on Germany  
REFERENCE : (a) Memo ORE conversation with  
[REDACTED] 25X1A

1. In accordance with reference (a) it is requested that this office be provided with intelligence information concerning the transmission of strategic military material or its components to the USSR and satellites from or through eastern Germany with particular reference to natural and synthetic fuel refineries and plants.

2. It is also requested that an estimate be provided of the trade between the eastern and western zones of Germany as well as what key strategic materials are being supplied to the USSR and satellites from or through eastern Germany.

25X1A

[REDACTED]

Attachment (1)  
Reference: Cases #589,673

124

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**TOP SECRET**

25X1C

**PROBLEM:**

To estimate [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] strategic military

25X1C

material or its components to the USSR and its  
satellites from or through Eastern Germany. ^

1. In order to prepare such an estimate, various research analyses and considerable technical advice are required from both CIA components and IAC Agencies.
2. D/WE will arrange for the preparation of such analyses and the procurement of such technical advice from the appropriate sources, and on the basis of these data will prepare an estimate of what key strategic materials being supplied <sup>to</sup> by the USSR ~~uniquely~~ from or through eastern Germany [REDACTED]

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations (see separate sheet) should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

**FROM:** 25X1A 2 December 1949  
 [REDACTED] - 251 South

ACCESSION NO.

DATE RECEIVED IN S. A.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
25X1A ID/Pub.ORE [REDACTED]					
2.					
3.					
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
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		
TO: <i>Note</i>		DATE _____
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	
REMARKS: <div style="background-color: black; width: 100px; height: 30px; margin-bottom: 10px;"></div> <i>IP. 99</i> <i>This is the way D/WE looks at it</i> <i>Best timing: to produce what we can by 1 Dec - then add as available.</i>		
FROM:		
BUILDING	ROOM NO.	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8  
SEP 1946

Room Ext 593  
~~Alb - Imp Exp~~  
Sov Zone - Gov  
 available  
Alb: Imp (non Sov) Exp (Gov)  
earliest possible   
(week - 10 days)

No. Korea — same sort

Sov Zone —

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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : CHIEF, D/Pub


FROM : CHIEF, D/WE

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC MATERIAL FOR USSR FROM EASTERN GERMANY

DATE: 13 December 1949

1. D/WE is preparing an estimate of the transmission of strategic material or its components to the USSR and its satellites from eastern Germany. This estimate will be based on analyses submitted by IAC Agencies of strategic key material either of a military nature or contributing to Soviet war potential being supplied to the USSR and the satellites from Eastern Germany.
2. It is requested, therefore, that D/WE be furnished with the above analyses from OIR (State), ID (Army), and A-2 (Air Force). Included in the foregoing should be the output of electronics plants, scientific laboratories or research institutes, synthetic fuel plants, munitions plants, and plants manufacturing spare parts for tanks, anti-aircraft artillery, machine guns and other weapons, including naval armament or equipment, and such chemical industries as are engaged in the production of material which contributes directly or indirectly to Soviet war potential. Some estimate of the extent to which Soviet, as well as satellite, war potential industry depends upon shipment of critical materials from the Soviet Zone should be included.
3. It is requested that this information be submitted by the close of business 28 December 1949.

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STATE INTELLIGENCE GROUP

DOCUMENT CONTROL

Series

1P

Number

49

Date of Document 14 Dec

Secret  
30

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DATE

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1, 2, 3

State

12-16

4, 5

Army

12-16

6, 7

Navy

12-16

8, 9

Air

12-16

29, 30

D/WE

19 Dec

28

D/WE for OSI

9 Jan

11 & 12

AD/IRE

1-31-50

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13

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

24 December 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the Secretary of State  
For Research and Intelligence  
Director of Intelligence, General Staff, US Army  
Director of Naval Intelligence  
Director of Intelligence, US Air Force

SUBJECT: Strategic Material for USSR from Eastern Germany

REFERENCE: DCI 3/1, dated 8 July 1948

1. Problem.

ONE is making a continuing study of the transmission of strategic material or its components to the USSR and its satellites from Eastern Germany.

2. Scope.

The study will include the output of electronics plants, scientific laboratories or research institutes, synthetic fuel plants, munitions plants, and plants manufacturing spare parts for tanks, anti-aircraft artillery, machine guns and other weapons, including naval armament or equipment, and such chemical industries as are engaged in the production of material which contributes directly or indirectly to Soviet war potential. Some estimate of the extent to which Soviet, as well as satellite, war potential industry depends upon shipment of critical materials from the Soviet Zone will also be included.

3. Departmental Action Required.

a. The departmental intelligence organizations are requested to supply such of this information as may lie within their fields of competence by the close of business 28 December 1949.

25X1A

b. Inquiries on this project should be addressed to [REDACTED] Code 143, extension 2249.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

Extensions: 16 Jan  
25 Jan

25X1A

[REDACTED]  
THEODORE RABBITT  
Assistant Director  
Reports and Estimates

call at 1630

call this

25X1A

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

24 December 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the Secretary of State  
for Research and Intelligence  
Director of Intelligence, General Staff, US Army  
Director of Naval Intelligence  
Director of Intelligence, US Air Force

SUBJECT: Strategic Material for USSR from Eastern Germany

REFERENCE: DCI 3/1, dated 8 July 1948

1. Problem.

OSI is making a continuing study of the transmission of strategic material or its components to the USSR and its satellites from Eastern Germany.

2. Scope.

The study will include the output of electronics plants, scientific laboratories or research institutes, synthetic fuel plants, munitions plants, and plants manufacturing spare parts for tanks, anti-aircraft artillery, machine guns and other weapons, including naval armament or equipment, and such chemical industries as are engaged in the production of material which contributes directly or indirectly to Soviet war potential. Some estimate of the extent to which Soviet, as well as satellite, war potential industry depends upon shipment of critical materials from the Soviet Zone will also be included.

3. Departmental Action Required.

a. The departmental intelligence organizations are requested to supply such of this information as may lie within their fields of competence by the close of business 28 December 1949.

25X1A

b. Inquiries on this project should be addressed to  
[REDACTED] Code 143, extension 2249.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

25X1A

[REDACTED]  
THEODORE BARBETT  
Assistant Director  
Reports and Estimates

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*File  
IP-49*

Assistant Director, ORE

17 February 1950

Chief, Western Europe Division, ORE

Lack of cooperation of IAC agencies.

1. On 7 December 1949 this Division received through the Publications Division a request from OPC for a study on the "Transmission of Strategic Materials Through the Soviet Zone of Germany".

2. Following a conference between representatives of OPC and D/WE, terms of reference were agreed on and it was decided that other components of ORE and the IAC agencies should be asked to contribute.

3. Tab A is a copy of the running log of this project as kept by this Division's Chief of Intelligence Control. Tab B is a report submitted to me by the Intelligence Control member who worked on the project.

4. I feel that you will be interested in the lack of cooperation revealed in these tabs, particularly the performance of OIR.

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Copy for: D/Pub

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Tab "A"

17 February 1950

25X1A

9/XII/49 Received from [REDACTED] D/Pub at close of business.

12/XII/49 Requests for data on this project made in writing to D/EE, D/EC.

13/XII/49 Requests for data on this subject made to OIR, A-2, ID through D/Pub [REDACTED] ONI included at suggestion of [REDACTED] 25X1A

19/XII/49 Following phone calls from OIR and A-2 to [REDACTED] stating that some material was available but deadline was too short to work it up. Deadline altered to 16 January and [REDACTED] so advised. 25X1A

27/XII/49 1500 - Date requested of D/EE received and given to [REDACTED] 25X1A

29/XII/49 0530 - [REDACTED] conferred with Dr. [REDACTED] and agreed to do what they could.

9/I/50 Deadline altered to 25 January.

30/I/50 1100 - A-2 and ONI Air contributions received and handed to Livermore.

I/II/50 1430 - [REDACTED] D/Pub, reports that a [REDACTED] of OIR called and stated that through some misunderstanding or mishandling, OIR had not started work on this project, but was assigning a Mr. Strauss to it at once and that he would get in touch with Livermore. A request was made on [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] to get a statement in writing from OIR to the above effect. [REDACTED] at first demurred because it would serve no useful purpose except to put OIR on the spot and that it would jeopardize [REDACTED] relations with OIR's liaison people. [REDACTED] stated that in view of the many postponements and long delay in preparing this paper, D/Pub should tell OIR that a further postponement of deadline could be effected only if a request to that end were made in writing through channels. [REDACTED] also suggested that [REDACTED] talk to someone with more authority than [REDACTED] 25X1A

Livermore was instructed - these instructions were known to D/Pub - that if Strauss called he was to be asked how long the job would take him, and any of his questions were to be answered. If Strauss's contribution arrived in time to be used it should be incorporated. If not we would pass our findings on without it. Livermore anticipates little useful data from State.



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Tab "A" (con'd)

17 Feb. 1950

2/II/50

Strauss after talk with [REDACTED] decided that State could add nothing to this paper and will make no contribution. OIR - Barnard - advised [REDACTED] that this statement would be confirmed in writing.

7/II/50

1130 - Confirmation received as above.

13/II/50

0930 - OSI contribution received and passed to Livermore.

15/II/50

Copy of study, in duplicate, and 5 appendices forwarded this date to D/Pub. Project completed.

- 2 -

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Tab "B"

17 February 1950

To: Chief, D/WE

From: Intelligence Control, 1 - H

Subject: Cooperation of IAC agencies and CIA components in Estimate for OPC.

Intelligence Control 1-H wishes to call attention to the generally unsatisfactory attitude taken by the IAC agencies and CIA components in regard to the Memorandum sent them by D/WE on 14 December 1949. In view of further requests that may be made for such cooperation on the working level, the matter is of more than passing importance.

#### IAC Agencies

**Air Force:** The report submitted by A-2 was excellent in all respects. It covered the field thoroughly and in detail, and its conclusions were clear and unequivocal. Great pains were taken in the preparation, particularly with the appendices, and the result stands as a model of what should be expected from this type of cooperative effort. Unfortunately, the drop from this to the level of effort of the other participants in this Estimate was startling.

**Navy:** Although ONI appeared most cordial in its wish to cooperate, and conferences were held with the people concerned in the preparation of the ONI report, the finished product was very disappointing. It consisted of two typed pages of generalized statements and a list of plants that might or might not be engaged in making war material on the Soviet account. The report was too brief and sketchy to be of much use, and its value was chiefly negative. ONI also contributed references to four documents it had prepared previously on this subject, but while of general interest, all were too out of date to meet the requirements of the Estimate.

**Army:** G-2 contributed nothing but a very belated reference to four documents that it had previously prepared on the subject. Three of the documents were too out of date to be of service, and the other could not be located. G-2 also volunteered to do something additional in the event these documents were found unsatisfactory, but the offer, which was made by telephone to D/Pub, came too late for acceptance.

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Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100050003-9

Tab "B" (con'd)

17 Feb. 1950

**State:** D/WE's Memorandum was misrouted in OIR, and did not reach the proper desk in DRE until about 1 February. Although the subject of the Estimate was then discussed with a representative of DRE, who volunteered to make some slight contribution, this offer was subsequently cancelled on higher authority, and nothing was forthcoming from OIR.

**CIA Components**

**OSI:** OSI was most agreeable and cooperative in preliminary discussions of the problem involved. Its performance, however, did not come up to the level of its promises. The report, although superior to what was attempted by the other CIA components, was generally sketchy and inconclusive. It also gave signs of hasty preparation after D/WE had instituted inquiries with regard to its progress some weeks later.

**Ec/G:** Both these components took the attitude that while they had all the necessary material, they did not have the time or the manpower to prepare a satisfactory report. Consequently, the project was undertaken with the greatest reluctance, and neither contribution was of any value. D/EE did little more than to list 50 reports by number to indicate where the desired information might be found if one wanted to look for it. Both components also strongly raised the point, as did ONI, that since all this material was available to D/WE they were under no obligation to put themselves to any extra trouble in the preparation of a finished report.

**and**

**D/EE:**

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Chief, Publications Division, ORE

15 February 1950

Chief, Western Europe Division, ORE

Transmission of Strategic Materials through SOVZONE Germany

1. Attached herewith is a study, with appendices, on the above subject to answer the requirements of IP-49, 7 December 1949.

2. Your attention is invited to the fact that this study is based on contributions from the ONI and A-2, as well as from components of CIA. OIR declined in writing to supply material on the ground that it could add nothing to the information already in ORE's possession. Department of Army contribution not in form to be forwarded, but was used in preparation of study.

3. Copies have not been furnished to any office but yours. No clearance has been sought on the study.

25X1A



Enclosures:

CC

5 Appendices

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**TOP SECRET**

ESTIMATE OF THE IMPORTANCE TO THE SOVIET WAR POTENTIAL OF THE  
TRANSMISSION OF STRATEGIC MATERIAL OR ITS COMPONENTS FROM  
EASTERN GERMANY (SOVIET ZONE) TO THE USSR

Following the close of World War II the industrial potential of the Soviet Zone was to a very large degree dismantled and shipped to the USSR. This was particularly the case in regard to those industries of a highly specialized scientific or technical character which would contribute directly to building up Soviet war potential. In addition to the physical plant and equipment of this type shipped to the USSR, about 7,000 German scientists and their families (a total of 30,000 people) were removed to the USSR in October 1946 to work under direct Soviet supervision on the development of various scientific projects connected with the Soviet war effort. Since that time there has been no further mass removal of scientists or technicians, although individuals have been forced from time to time to take up residence in the USSR. Such removals have been dictated by security considerations, and the vast bulk of materials and knowledge which Germany can contribute to the Soviet war potential is now located far behind the Iron Curtain. The very limited amount of equipment and technical skill remaining in eastern Germany is employed for the most part in experimental work, the results of which are sent to the USSR for production on a large scale. In the event of war it is estimated that the USSR could expand the remaining facilities in eastern Germany to a considerable extent, but at the most it would not amount to much more than 5 percent of the total war potential of the USSR. The importance of this, however, lies in the fact that it releases manpower, materials and equipment in the USSR for other military or industrial purposes.

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The point at which the USSR is most dependant upon the Soviet Zone, is the uranium mining industry in the Kragebirge region on the frontier of the Soviet Zone and Czechoslovakia. Latest reports indicate that the USSR is continuing "feverish uranium mining activity" in this region. It is estimated that the USSR atomic energy program obtains approximately 50 percent of its uranium from the Wismut AG in Saxony. The Soviet Zone supplies most of the mining and concentrating machinery, and probably all of the building materials, chemicals, electric power and food stocks used by the Wismut AG. During the last quarter of 1949 the SMA assigned Wismut first priority for delivery of industrial equipment within the Soviet Zone. About 125,000 German workers are employed under conditions of forced labor, accidents are frequent, production has been curtailed recently by explosions in the shafts, and sabotage is by no means out of the question.

The electronics industry of eastern Germany provides very little strategic electronics material for the USSR. For security reasons about 140 plants were removed to the USSR. The most important category of goods still being exported from the skeleton organization left behind is electronic test equipment. In case of war, the USSR could allocate production of standard or well-known items such as field radios to Soviet Zone plants in order to free their own plants for more highly classified work. This development is not believed likely because of insecurity of the east German political situation and the relatively exposed location of the area.

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In eastern Germany there are apparently no scientific laboratories or research institutes presently engaged in nuclear research, nor is it likely that such research will be undertaken in the future. There are from four to six industrial laboratories and one research institute engaged in the development of precision instruments of value to the Soviet nuclear energy program. The quantitative contribution of these laboratories, either actual or potential, is not known. Engineering data and instrument models for radiation-intensity meters, process-control instruments, electron microscopes, cyclotrons and computers are shipped to Moscow for dissemination to Soviet factories. In the field of biological research there are at present two institutes engaged in research in human and animal infectious diseases and in small-scale production of vaccines. Although not engaged in biological warfare activities at present, these installations are capable of making an important contribution to Soviet war potential in this field, if given new and modern equipment by the USSR.

Geophysical equipment of certain types is strategically important to the USSR, which in the past has been dependent on Germany for this type of instrument for operational as well as research uses. Although some German factories have been moved to the USSR, others are known to be in operation and have been recently re-equipped. Soviet inadequacy in this field is marked, and continued use of German-type instruments and delivery to the USSR is essential. Soviet supervision of this work is conducted through the Scientific Technical Bureau of the Hydrometeorological Service of the SMA at 15 Rembrandtstrasse, Potsdam. Only fragmentary and indirect information is available on centers of research and development, production statistics, and volume of shipments.

The munitions and armaments industry, after having been dismantled to a very large extent at the end of the war, has been allowed to start operations again on a limited scale. At present, there are an estimated 28 installations in this field: 15 in the munitions industry, 6 in the tank components industry, and 7 devoted to anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. The total output, however, represents a very small part of Soviet production in this field, and although it could be greatly expanded in the event of hostilities, the Soviet Zone contribution would still not be over 5 percent of the total Soviet output.

Most of the shipyards in eastern Germany are now being rebuilt and expanded. At present there are 11 installations in operation. Six of them are engaged in the production of small craft which can be readily converted to patrol or mine-laying vessels in case of hostilities; the other five installations are used for repair work for Soviet naval units and commercial shipping. There is also a definite probability that certain steel and machinery plants are manufacturing ship and submarine components for delivery to the USSR. The Office of Naval Intelligence is of the opinion, however, that little of the Soviet Zone production can be described as essential to the USSR in the sense [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Despite rumors to the contrary, there is no evidence of submarine construction or assembly in eastern Germany.

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The contribution of the east German synthetic fuels industry to the Soviet war potential is small but significant because of its strategic location with respect to actual and potential Soviet consuming units. Seven known plants are in operation, of which three (Zeitz, Boehlen, and Leuna) account for over 90 percent of the output. Annual production is estimated at 1,200,000 metric tons. One fourth of this total is allocated to the German economy; the rest is either stockpiled or shipped to the USSR, but in what proportions is not known. If maintained only at present levels, the industry would considerably lessen the transport problem involved in shipping fuel from the USSR. There are indications that the capacity of the Soviet Zone plants may be expanded once other shortcomings in the zonal economy are overcome.

Inasmuch as the economy of the Soviet Zone has been systematically subordinated to the needs of the USSR, zonal industry has contributed to the war potential of the USSR but on a consistently low level. Because of Soviet reparations and dismantling policies and practices, the zonal economy has been greatly weakened, and the results continue to be apparent in the difficulties encountered by all major industries in meeting production quotas. As this situation improves, however, under Soviet plans for rehabilitation and expansion, a greater and more regular volume of machine tools, ball bearings, chemicals, and other critical items can be expected. Up to now, material shortages and plant deterioration have kept these items in short supply. Little is known at present with regard to the actual production of such items or the extent to which they are shipped to the USSR. In no instance, however, are shipments from the Soviet Zone, apart from raw materials such as potash, coal, scrap metal, timber and foodstuffs, in sufficient quantities to add materially to Soviet war potential.

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NOTE: An evaluation of the separate items and plants is contained in the Appendices.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Project: **IP-50**

IP-50

OFFICE OF PLANNING AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: **7 Dec 1949**

7 Dec 1949

To: **D/IN**

From: Publications Division, Projects Planning

Subject: **Purges** Purges

Statement of Project:

Origin: **Internal**

Problem: To provide specific and related information requested "relative to purges of individuals and groups of individuals by the Soviet Government or Soviet satellite governments."

Scope: The scope is to be worked out at a meeting between requester and Division on 9 December

Graphics (if any):

Form: **Enumeration**

Draft due in D/In: **earliest convenience**

Dissemination deadline  
(if any):

Responsible Division: **D/IN**

Internal Coordination: **None**

Departmental responsibilities:

**None**

Classification to be no higher than:

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Recommended Dissemination:

**R.O.**

*Study cancelled in view of  
lack of material*

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**SECRET**

1. Deviationism
2. Forges
3. USSR - Pol. & govt.
4. Soviet Satellites - Pol. & govt.

**SECRET**

2 December 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pub, ORE      25X1A  
ATTENTION : [REDACTED]  
SUBJECT : Request for Study on Purges

1. It is requested that this office be furnished information relative to purges of individuals and groups of individuals by the Soviet Government or Soviet satellite governments. We are interested primarily in those cases where the grounds were political offenses (rather than immorality, illegality or inefficiency). We are especially interested in cases where the offense of which the individual was suspected:

- a. Deviationism (i.e. Trotskyism or Titoism)
- b. Espionage or other undercover activities
- c. Foreign sympathies

2. Our primary interest is to know what evidence was accepted by the Soviets as proof of the offense. If the means of detection are known (complaint, technical means, or other), such information would also be most helpful.

3. By the word "purges" this section refers to those cases where government officials or trusted party members have been liquidated imprisoned or removed. We have no interest in those cases where ordinary citizens have been discovered in subversive activities. We are especially interested in purges of high officials or party members.

4. Our interest centers more on those purges which were isolated incidents, rather than those which formed a part of great mass purgings such as those of 1934 and 1937-38. In other words we prefer those cases which, from a Soviet point of view, were judged on their own merits, rather than those which took place at a time of universal suspicion, when great masses of individuals were swept away on the flimsiest of pretexts.

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
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-2-

5. We are interested in purges which took place either in Russia or in the Communist organization in other European countries.

6. If there is an abundance of information on post-war cases of the types outlined above, then we would restrict our attention to them, but if necessary we would be interested also in pre-war cases.

25X1A



Reference: Case No. 681

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